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Abstract 
 
In this paper we consider what is the current practice when a purchaser has to decide on the 
number of bids he wants to receive in a tender procedure. Furthermore we look to what extent 
a formal model, the so-called ETQ-model, together with a DSS can be useful in facilitating 
and improving that decision. The validity of the model assumptions is analyzed with 
empirical evidence from over thirty cases. Furthermore, a few interviews were conducted with 
tactical purchasers to gain insight into the practical applicability of the model and the DSS 
and identify specific directions for further improvement.  
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When to use competitive bidding? 
 
Competitive bidding (or tendering) remains an important purchasing practice. With 
competitive bidding the market mechanism (competition between suppliers) is used to obtain 
the lowest price and/or best value for money. Both the private and the public sector make use 
of competitive bidding. Whereas for the first only the best value for money is important, for 
the latter also public accountability plays an important role (Holmes, 1995). In governmental 
agencies tendering procedures are often compulsory (GPA, directives on tendering in the 
European Union). These directives should provide public accountability and improve the 
effectiveness of purchasing and fair trade within (EU and other) marketplaces. This is done by 
setting up the tender procedures in such a way that all tenders are evaluated in a uniform way 
and that the contract is given to the supplier with the most economic bid (Smyth, 1997).  
 
It is good to note the difference in tendering procedures between the public and private sector, 
because of this public accountability. In private firms often negotiations follow after the 
tender procedure to determine the final price (Leenders, Fearon, 1993), a practice that is often 
forbidden for governmental purchases. This makes it even more important for the public 
sector to arrange the tendering procedure as good as possible as no "damage control" can be 
done with extra negotiations afterwards. 
 
When to apply competitive bidding? Clearly, when a situation exists that will prevent the 
market mechanism in some way, the outcome of a tendering procedure may not be optimal, 
making it therefore less applicable. This is the case when not enough possible suppliers (only 
a few or even one) are available. Also with a collusion of (some of) the bidders the 
competition element is destroyed. Knowing that this will occur just negotiating with a few 
suppliers would probably lead to the same outcome, but without the whole effort of setting up 
the whole tendering procedure (Holmes, 1995). Competitive bidding is also difficult when the 
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specification of the product is not clear, making the comparison of tenders a difficult job and 
therefore more costly. Negotiations in this case can be more flexible and it could be better for 
developing trust between companies. This flexibility may also help to adapt new technology 
more quickly. From this it can be concluded that competitive bidding is especially useful for 
leverage (and to some extent) routine purchases in terms of the purchasing portfolio of Kraljic 
(Kraljic, 1983) . 
 
The main reason that competitive bidding is limited however lies with the company (agency) 
that is doing the tendering procedure. Assuming a perfect market mechanism the lowest price 
will be achieved by requesting as many tenders as possible, because the level of the lowest bid 
will be lower on average as the number of bidders increases (Holt, 1979). The most important 
factor that is limiting this, is the costs involved with a tender procedure for the purchasing 
organisation (McMillan, 1998). These costs can be substantial and consist of costs that are 
fixed and costs that vary with the number of companies that are invited to tender. Fixed costs 
are mainly the costs of setting up the procedure, writing the request for quotations with the 
specifications and defining an evaluation procedure. The variable costs related to each bid are 
the costs associated with: handling queries, filing, reading and evaluating the tenders and 
informing the supplier of the outcome. Given the high complexity of some tenders the time 
spend on evaluation can be huge.  
 
From the above we can conclude that in order to ensure a competitive bid the selection of 
possible suppliers must be numerous, qualified and reliable enough, but not more than 
necessary in view of the tendering costs involved with each extra bid (see also Leenders, 
Fearon,1993). 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
There is therefore a trade off between the best bid that can be expected and the tendering costs 
that are necessary to obtain it. Hence, there will be an optimal number of tenders that 
minimizes the total costs of the tendering process, i.e. the tendering costs together with the 
expected price that will be paid for the contract. Graphically this trade off is shown in Figure 
1. Note that the purchaser implicitly controls these total costs to a certain extent by deciding at 
the beginning of the process on the number of tenders he wants to receive. For the latter part 
of the paper we will refer to the optimal number of tenders as the Economic Tender Quantity 
(ETQ, see De Boer, Van Dijkhuizen, Telgen, 2000). 
 
 
Calculating the economic tender quantity (ETQ) 
  
In order to be able to quantify the ETQ a formal decision model has been developed (De 
Boer, Van Dijkhuizen, Telgen, 2000 and earlier work by Lansdowne, 1996). We will now 
first discuss this model and its assumptions in order to be able to explain how the validity of 
the assumptions can be checked. 
 
In the ETQ model assumptions are made on three areas: the bid evaluation, the suppliers and 
the tendering costs. First, considering the bid evaluation it is assumed that price is the only 
criterion, hence the bid with the lowest price will be awarded the contract. However all other 
criteria that can be translated into a price (like for instance the delivery time may be expressed 
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as costs), can be included easily. This assumption is made for simplification reasons as the bid 
has to be compared with the tendering costs and it is more complicated to quantify the ETQ in 
a kind multi-criteria setting. 
 
Each supplier is assumed to give an independent bid. Also all suppliers make a bid from the 
same probability distribution (for the rest of this paper referred to as the "bid distribution"). 
For instance when this probability distribution is uniform between 10 and 15, all suppliers 
give a random bid between those boundaries (and of course the lowest one will be awarded 
the contract). In practical terms a purchaser needs to have enough knowledge of the supply 
market to be able to estimate what bid prices can be expected. 
 
Looking at the tendering costs the fixed costs are not relevant. Having decided to start a 
tendering procedure the fixed costs are not dependent on the number of bids (thus constant) 
and can therefore be omitted. The variable costs are assumed to be proportional with the 
number of tenders (every tender will take the same amount of time to evaluate). 
 
Using these assumptions De Boer et al. (De Boer, Van Dijkhuizen, Telgen, 2000) showed that 
for a  different types of bid distributions (in particular the uniform, triangular and normal 
probability distribution) the ETQ is uniquely determined by the parameters of that bid 
distribution and the costs per tender. An example of this is given in Figure 2. Here we 
assumed the bids have a normal distribution (µ,σ) and the bid spread as is used on the vertical 
axis in the graph is defined as the 2σ value on both sides, hence 4σ in total, which means 
about 95% of the bids will be within the bidspread defined in this way. 
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
Having estimated the evaluation costs per tender and the two parameters of the normal 
distribution, with Figure 2, the ETQ can be obtained. Not that actually the ETQ is only 
dependent on the bid spread (thus σ) and the costs per tender and not on the mean of the 
normal distribution µ. De Boer et al. showed that this holds for all investigated distributions. 
In other words the optimal number of bids to be requested is not dependent on the average 
market price, but only on the expected spread  in the market and on the evaluation costs. 
Based on this company rules like inviting at least X suppliers to tender above a certain 
threshold for the contract value have no rationality. 
 
The validity of the ETQ model however depends on the validity of the assumptions. First of 
all, the suppliers each have to submit a bid independently. This assumption is of course very 
hard to check as no supplier will easily admit this not to be true officially taking into account 
the legal implications (anti-trust laws). Second, and this can be checked, which probability 
distributions for the bids actually occur in practice? To check this we send out a request to 
both public agencies and private companies for tender procedures where at least five tenders 
were received (in order to be able to conclude something about the bidspread the number of 
tenders should not be too low). More than 30 cases were received and the outcome will be 
discussed in the next section. Third, the evaluation costs were assumed to be proportional per 
tender. These costs mainly consist of the working hours spend by purchasers and therefore 
then these working hours must be estimated. In most companies not much data exists on these 
working hours. To gain more insight in the actual evaluation costs a few interviews with 
tactical purchasers were conducted. In these interviews also the practical applicability of the 
The 10th International Annual IPSERA Conference 2001 476
ETQ model was tested. We will come back to that after the section about the results on the bid 
distributions. 
 
 
Bid distributions in practice 
 
In auctioning literature (e.g. Milgrom, 1989; Riley, 1989; Cripps, Ireland, 1994) the suppliers 
are always considered to act rationally and independently and submit a bid that will maximize 
their expected revenue. As the focus is on the bidder's side, the distribution that occurs for the 
buyer receiving a number of those bids is not considered. A phenomenon that can occur is the 
so-called "winner's curse": a situation where the supplier with the lowest bid, a bid that is 
much lower than the rest (and therefore is awarded the contract), estimated the costs too low 
(having misunderstood the information perhaps), leaving the winner with a non profitable 
contract and therefore it often leads to bad performance from his side (Milgrom, 1989; 
Beattie, Fearnley, 1998). When looking at the distribution of bids for one tendering procedure 
a few low bids (compared to the rest) extra could occur because of this. Also in a tendering 
procedure suppliers who do not really want that specific contract (having no capacity 
available at that moment for instance), but still want to show their interest (giving them more 
chance for similar contracts in the future), may submit higher, less competitive bids. Taking 
this effect together with the winner's curse into consideration the bid distribution could have 
long tails with low and high prices. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section we send out a request for information about tender 
procedures, particular the ones where a considerable amount of bids were received. This 
request was send to various companies and public agencies in the Netherlands. We 
specifically asked for cases with at least five bids in order be able to at least estimate to a 
certain extent which bid probability distribution is applicable. The other condition was that 
the price had to be the dominant criterion in the tender procedure as other criteria are not 
taken into account in the ETQ model. As a result we received back over 30 cases that met 
those conditions. 
 
The majority of these cases (about 70%) came from public agencies (municipalities, 
provinces, universities). The number of bids per case varied from 5 to 12. The price of the 
contracts varied from about 30,000 Euro to 50 million Euro as far as the prices were given. As 
we are only interested in the spread companies could also index the actual prices for 
confidentiality reasons. 
The variety in the purchases was also high ranging from supplies like nitrogen gas, cars, 
chairs and PCs to services like cleaning and works like road construction and tunneling. 
Depending on the products, the different markets, the standard deviation in the bids (as a 
percentage) was also very different for each case, ranging from 2 % to 40 %. Another obvious 
result from the cases was that the spread of the bids for a large number of those cases was in a 
way similar: most bids are quite close to each other, whereas the highest and/or the lowest 
was very different from the rest. 
 
Insert figure 3 here 
 
Unfortunately even the highest number of bids per case we received, namely 12, is still a very 
small number to make a good fit of a probability distribution. However for this case (buying 
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PCs, the prices were indexed) a Q-Q plot (quantile-quantile graph) was made in order to look 
to what extent a normal distribution was applicable (see Figure 3). When a normal 
distribution applies to the bid data the points in the figure should fit in a straight line (y = 
A*x+B) where A (the slope) is equal to the σ of the normal distribution and B is equal to the 
mean µ. The linear fit in Figure 3 shows the actual data deviates a bit, but the number of 
points is too small to fit any distribution with high confidence (in other words to make reliable 
chi-squared tests).  
 
We therefore had to take a more global view on the bid data. In order to be able to compare all 
cases better we indexed them all the same, dividing each bid value with the average of  the 
case it belongs to (making the average bid 1 for all cases). After that from each bid value 1 
was subtracted, making the average 0 instead of 1. 
 
Insert figures 4 and 5 here 
 
Assuming a normal distribution may be applicable for each case also the sum of all cases can 
be considered as the sum of two normal distributions with the same mean is itself a normal 
distribution again. In this way we have almost 200 data points. With these points we 
performed a symmetry check (see Figure 4) and we made a Q-Q plot in order to check 
whether the aggregation of all bid data could be fit with a normal distribution (see Figure 5). 
In figure 4 the bid data was divided into two, comparing the lowest with the highest value, the 
next lowest with the next highest and so on. Having a symmetric distribution and applying 
linear fitting would lead to a slope of that fit equal to –1. In this case the slope is more 
negative, indicating the upper tail of the distribution is wider than the lower tail (more excess 
in very high bids than in very low bids). Furthermore the Q-Q plot in Figure 5 indicates that 
the bid data can not be fit with a normal distribution. The right tail is clearly above the linear 
fit, whereas the left tail is below. This indicates a probability distribution with a bigger 
probability density for the tails would give a better fit. Note that for the triangular and uniform 
distribution this probability density of the tails is even less than for the normal distribution, 
making them therefore (compared to the normal distribution) even less applicable. 
Distributions that assign a bigger probability distribution to the tails are Student t-
distributions. The ETQ-model has not been checked for these distributions yet though and 
obviously this would be a good thing to do in the immediate future as the empirical evidence 
suggests using t-distributions. Looking back to the beginning of this section the evidence we 
found for wide distributions seems to support the ideas about the winner's curse and having a 
few non competitive high bids extra. 
 
 
Use the ETQ model in practice: developing and testing a DSS  
 
For practical application we developed a prototype decision support system (DSS) of the 
ETQ-model. We expected the DSS to aid the user of the ETQ-model by presenting the input 
parameters in a clear way, performing all necessary calculations automatically and presenting 
the results graphically. A screenshot of this DSS can be seen in Figure 6. To be able to use the 
DSS a purchaser will need to have enough information about the market to be able to estimate 
what bid prices can be expected (and thus what kind of distribution) . Furthermore he needs to 
have an idea on the time (costs) that will be involved with each tender. Based on this input the 
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ETQ together with the outcome of the total costs are calculated. Naturally the better the input 
can be estimated the more accurate the predicted outcome will be. 
 
Insert figure 6 here 
 
With this DSS available we conducted a couple of interviews with tactical purchasers of a 
small number of companies and public agencies to use the DSS in their practice. The main 
goal was to test to what extent the tool (and also the model behind it)  was indeed considered 
useful and how it could be improved. 
 
For these interviews we formulated a testing protocol in order to cover all aspects in an 
organised way within an hour (and therefore it was not needed to ask for too much time of the 
purchasers increasing the number of  people willing / able to cooperate). The testing protocol 
consisted of five items: asking for a brief overview of the company, the role of purchasing and 
the position of the interviewed in this, explanation of the ETQ-model, explanation of the DSS 
with an example, trying out the DSS with cases from practice of the interviewed person and 
finally an evaluation by means of a small questionnaire. Here we will briefly present and 
discuss the results of two interviews. 
 
The first interview was held with a Purchasing manager (manager A) in a global manufacturer 
of clothing and shoes. A is working in a subsidiary in the Netherlands. The purchasing 
department she is working in has only recently been created and hence few to none 
procedures exist. When asked for a general opinion, she indicated that the ETQ-DSS would 
not be particularly relevant for her. Tender quantity decisions were based on intuition and 
were not perceived as specifically difficult. As a rule of thumb, 5 to 6 suppliers would be 
normally be invited of which usually 2 to 3 could be discarded right away. The ETQ-DSS was 
applied to a case A had recently been involved in. This case concerned the selection of a 
supplier of business cards and stationery. A clearly indicated that it would have been very 
difficult for her to estimate the bidspread for this case. She did not have experience with 
purchasing this particular item, nor did she know anyone within the company who had such 
experience. Furthermore, relying on experience from previous positions in other companies 
would have been difficult because the particular characteristics of the required items were 
different. A had initially approached six potential suppliers but this was merely to assess their 
technical capability and willingness to supply. Out of these suppliers, three were asked to 
submit a bid. Based on the bids received and A’s estimate of the variable evaluation costs, we 
used the ETQ-DSS to determine the ETQ for this case. The result confirmed the decision to 
ask three suppliers.  
 
The second interview was held with a purchasing manager (manager B) in a large Dutch 
bank. B is primarily concerned with supporting the purchasing of temporary labor. In B’s 
organization a formal procedure prescribed to at least ask for two quotes in case of projects 
exceeding a predefined financial threshold. The ETQ-DSS was applied to the case of 
outsourcing certain research work. In B’s organization, one department would normally 
conduct this research but an expected increase in the demand for this research had brought up 
the question whether or not B’s organization should use outside specialist suppliers to conduct 
the more operational aspects of this research. In that respect, the case concerned a make-or-
buy investigation. Initially eight suppliers were asked to quote. B indicated that by only 
briefly talking to a few suppliers the insight had emerged that relatively large price 
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differences were present on the market. Moreover, as the bank was already conducting some 
of this research in-house, B had a clear point of reference. However, from the 8 suppliers that 
were approached, B only continued with a subset of them. A limited number of suppliers 
could be discarded more or less immediately. Based on the received bids and B’s estimate of 
the variable cost of evaluation, we used the ETQ-DSS to determine the ETQ for this case. 
Again, the outcome was close to the number of suppliers that B had worked with more 
intensively. B indicated that the ETQ-DSS could prove to be useful in cases similar to the one 
tested here. However, B also mentioned the example of selecting suppliers for printed matter 
in which the organization will alternate between a limited set of known suppliers due to the 
required investments in tools. In that case B argued that the Tender Quantity decision would 
not be as problematic as compared to the outsourcing of research. 
 
Based on the two interviews and experiments with the ETQ-DSS we draw the following 
conclusions. Firstly, the experiments clearly point to the need to distinguish more specifically 
between different bidding situations – first time versus repetitive buys from a fixed set of 
suppliers – and to allow for different degrees of knowledge on bidspreads. In addition, the 
ETQ-DSS could be improved by facilitating the phased approach that purchasers apply in 
practice. Differentiating between various levels of variable evaluation costs could do this. 
Still, given the apparent limitations that have to be overcome, the tentative version of the 
ETQ-DSS seems to provide very reasonable solutions in the cases tested. 
 
 
General conclusions 
 
As competitive bidding with tendering procedures is a widely used practice the ETQ model 
potentially has a lot of practical value. Especially with the development of the DSS the actual 
application of these calculations is encouraged as it provides a user-friendly interface and a 
clear overview of the results. However estimating the input parameters still seems not always 
that straightforward. Thus some improvement for de DSS can be made by providing 
additional help for this. Furthermore other bid distributions like the Student t-distributions 
need to be incorporated in the ETQ model as suggested by the empirical evidence on the bid 
distributions. Another way of looking at the bid distribution might be to consider each 
supplier having a separate bid distribution from which they 'pick' their bid. Then not only the 
economic tender quantity can be calculated, but also the economic tender set (ETS, see De 
Boer, Van Dijkhuizen, Telgen, 2000), meaning that not only the number but also which of the 
suppliers should be invited to tender. Another extension which was also indicated in one of 
the interviews was incorporating a two-step selection of suppliers using a pre-selection phase. 
This possible extension already has been investigated by Heijboer (Heijboer, 2001). Finally 
an important improvement would be to include multiple criteria (not only price) in the 
decision process as this would increase the number of situations to which the model is 
applicable, considerably. 
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Figure 1: Trade off between tendering costs and the expected bids. 
 
 
Figure 2: Determining the ETQ with a normal bid distribution (the bold numbers in the graph 
denote the ETQ in that area of the graph). 
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Figure 3: Q-Q plot for one case (bids for supplying PCs). 
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Figure 4: Symmetry plot of all the bid data. 
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Figure 5: Q-Q plot of all the bid data. 
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Figure 6: DSS for calculating the ETQ (a screenshot). 
 
 
